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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-AN ANATHEMA
TO THE "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT"
The balance of power that exists between the United States
Supreme Court and the Congress in our constitutional system is a
precarious one. The respective responsibilities of the two bodies
are often vague and frequently hotly contested.' The Court, as final
arbiter of the Constitution, is often accused by critics of sitting as
a "isuper-legislature," immune from the demands of an electorate
and free to capriciously alter the Constitution.2 Judicial "activists,"
on the other hand, maintain that the Court is simply performing its
traditional function by protecting enumerated constitutional rights
against governmental encroachment. 3
In June of 1971, the Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics4 which,
in essence, recognized a cause of action allowing an individual to
receive money damages for a federal violation of his constitutionally
protected civil rights. This comment will discuss the nature of this
cause of action and its relation to the government in terms of the
conflicting interests of federal courts in safeguarding an individual's
constitutional rights and those of Congress in precluding certain
suits against the government. The obvious question presented is this:
May the federal government violate one's constitutional rights and
yet be immune from liability by operation of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity? Although couched in the narrow terms of sovereign
immunity and constitutional tort, the underlying issue is the proper
function of judiciary and legislature in our constitutional democracy.
I See Deutch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STN. L. REv. 169 (1968).
2 This issue has aroused the passions of many observers. Senator Sam J. Ervin,
Jr. of North Carolina has stated:
[Tihe course of the Supreme Court in recent years has been such as to
cause me to ponder the question whether fidelity to fact ought not to induce
its members to remove from the portal of the building which houses it the
majestic words, "Equal Justice Under Law," and to substitute for them the
superscription, "Not justice under law, but justice according to the personal
notions of the temporary occupants of this building."
The truth is that on many occasions during recent years the Supreme
Court has usurped and exercised the power of the Congress and the States to
amend the Constitution while professing to interpret it.
Ervin, The Role of the Supreme Court as the Interpreter of the Constitution, 26 ALA.
LAW. 389, 391 (1965). For a more scholarly approach to this issue, see Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
3 For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Barron, The Ambiguity of Judicial
Review, 1970 DUKE L.J. 591.
4 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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A BIVENS ANALYSIS
The complaint in Bivens alleged that agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics made a search which, because of the lack of
probable cause, amounted to a violation of the plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights.5 Plaintiff Bivens brought a civil action in a fed-
eral district court' based upon, inter alia, the theory that a cause of
action existed against the federal officers and that the district court
acquired jurisdiction because of the constitutional issue involved.'
The district court, however, dismissed the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction, holding that no federal question had been raised.
On appeal the Second Circuit was somewhat more sympathetic
to Bivens' claims, stating that the district court should have takenjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.8 However, the court held that
"[s] tatutory authority is a prerequisite for a federal cause of action
for damages, even though the wrong complained of is the violation
of a constitutional right."9 Therefore, the complaint was dismissed
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.' 0
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, re-
versed and held that a valid cause of action based solely upon a
violation of the fourth amendment did exist and that damages could
be obtained for any resulting injuries despite the absence of con-
gressional authorization." The Court reasoned that an individual's
fundamental rights-here his fourth amendment guarantees-need
to be protected in a federal forum and, absent specific congressional
prohibition, the Court possesses authority to award money dam-
ages.'" The doctrine thus expressed by the Court seems to give im-
petus to a new kind of constitutional cause of action in which courts
may compensate for injuries arising out of a governmental violation
of certain constitutional rights.
Although the opinion announces no revolutionary principles of
law, the doctrine enunciated in Bivens is unique in our legal sys-
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.
Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1966), states that:
[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive ofinterest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
8 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.
2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969).
9 Id.
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
11 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
12 Id. at 394-97.
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tem.'" Prior to this decision, claims such as Bivens' had to be ad-
judicated in a state court and were subject to the vagaries of state
tort law. 4 Since state tort law was neither designed nor intended to
protect constitutional guarantees, state remedies for constitutional
violations were woefully inadequate. 5 Thus, the Court found it
necessary, in order to secure the fundamental interest conveyed by
the fourth amendment, to distinguish between Bivens' claim and a
conventional tort action. With the Bivens decision, civil claims based
upon the violation of certain constitutional rights appear to occupy
a new, preferential status in the law. The exact extent of this status,
however, is still to be determined.' 6
RAMIFICATIONS OF BIVENS
Bivens concerns the violation of a fourth amendment right by
federal officials.' Yet, there is little in the decision to indicate that
the constitutional cause of action expoused therein is limited to the
narrow facts of that case. The case was decided in terms of "feder-
ally protected interests" and the power of the Court to "[a] uthorize
damages as a judicial remedy for the violation of a federal consti-
tutional right."' The language of the decision does not isolate the
13 See Justice Harlan's carefully reasoned concurring opinion. Id. at 398.
14 Justice Brennan emphasizes the lack of an adequate civil remedy in a state
court for an unreasonable search and seizure. The only basis for recovery would be
under a trespass or invasion of privacy tort theory, and certain defenses may be avail-
able to defeat such an action. Such defenses would effectively crush the right created
by the Constitution. In Bivens, the federal agents, although acting in violation of the
fourth amendment, were allowed inside the house by Bivens because of their apparent
federal authority. The defense of consent might possibly be available to the agents;
if so, it could defeat an action for trespass or invasion of privacy. See 403 U.S. at 394.
This argument is equally valid as applied to other fundamental rights since actions
in tort may not even exist at the state level that approximate the interest created by
the Constitution. For example, a first amendment violation of an individual's freedom
of speech has no parallel tort remedy; thus, such a right cannot be adequately pro-
tected in a state court on conventional tort grounds.
The need for a civil remedy is particularly acute in the Bivens situation. Bivens
was not criminally prosecuted and a remedy such as that typified by the exclusionary
rule would obviously be inappropriate.
15 The Court stated that "[tihe interests protected by the state laws regulating
trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be
inconsistent or even hostile." 403 U.S. at 394.
16 In Bivens, the question as to the government's immunity was not decided
since the issue was not raised in the courts below. 403 U.S. at 397-98. That issue will
be explored later in this comment.
17 Upon remand, the question of immunity was discussed by the Second Circuit
and the court held that the federal officers were not protected by governmental im-
munity. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). Circuit Judge Medina, however, avoided any direct con-
frontation with the issues of sovereign immunity or the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the questions raised in this comment remain alive.
18 403 U.S. at 400-01.
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fourth amendment as the sole basis for a cause of action; the Court
stressed the need for a forum to adequately redress any injury based
upon federally protected rights. 9
In the past the Court has specifically recognized that funda-
mental interests exist in such rights as speech and press,20 religion,21
association, 2 travel,23 and privacy.24 All of these rights operate as
limitations on federal power and few can be adequately protected
by state courts and state laws.25 Damages may result from a viola-
tion of one of these rights that equal or surpass any injury that may
result from an unreasonable search or seizure.26 Thus, it would
seem that if the Court has the power to provide a remedy based
upon the fourth amendment, it has the power to provide relief for
injuries based upon other fundamental constitutional rights. The
essence of the Court's power will permit no other conclusion; the
same factors that influenced the Bivens decision regarding the fourth
amendment are equally present when other constitutional guaran-
tees are examined.
The injury complained of in Bivens was brought about by the
acts of federal agents. The holding of the case, however, should not
automatically be interpreted to imply that a constitutional cause of
action exists solely for violations of protected interests by federal
officials. Although the Court discussed what it termed the greater
"capacity for harm" of a federal agent,2 7 similar actions by state
officials may be equally harmful.28 It has long been recognized that
through the fourteenth amendment those principles "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" are applicable to the states.20 To reason
that a violated principle which regulates both federal and state ac-
tion may be allowed redress if the perpetrator is a federal official
but not if he is a state agent flies in the face of the Court's rationale
that where a federally protected right is involved and injury results
from a violation of that right, the Court may redress the injury."0
The logical extension of Bivens seems to push in several direc-
tions toward expansion of the doctrine therein expressed. There is
19 Id. at 392.
20 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
21 U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
22 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
23 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
24 Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25 See note 14, supra.
26 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
27 403 U.S. at 392.
28 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
29 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
80 403 U.S. at 397.
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a strong suggestion that all of the Bill of Rights guarantees should
provide adequate bases for constitutional causes of action when they
are violated by either state or federal officials and injury results."
How far the Supreme Court will pursue the Bivens rationale is yet
to be seen. However, the most conservative reading of the case holds
that a definitive cause of action for violation of fourth amendment
rights by federal agents exists at a constitutional level-a level that
transcends both state and federal law.
A HYBRID CAUSE OF ACTION-THE "CONSTITUTIONAL TORT"
Some Aspects of Conventional Tort Theory
The cause of action in Bivens arises from a violation of fourth
amendment constitutional rights, yet the case resembles that of a
conventional tort action. While the concept of a "tort" is not always
easy to define with precision, 2 the principle involves violation of
a legally imposed duty with resultant injury to the person to whom
the duty is owed.' This generalization states little more than that a
court or jury may award damages in tort actions whenever it finds
that some kind of legal duty has been breached and injury has re-
sulted. The law of torts is thus extremely broad, encompassing a
wide variety of legal relationships which revolve around the unifying
concept of a legal duty.'
The action discussed in Bivens, therefore, could be viewed as
essentially an action in tort; the necessary legal duty is imposed by
the fourth amendment and the consequent injury flows from a vio-
lation of this duty. Moreover, the Court's language in Bivens is
consistent with that often used in articulating general tort theory.
31 Such fundamental constitutional rights as speech and press, religion, privacy,
and travel could provide the foundation for a Bivens type cause of action. As stated
in the text, there is little to distinguish these rights from the fourth amendment right
protected by the Bivens cause of action.
82 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 1 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
W. PROSSER].
-3 "A tort is a legal concept possessing the basic elements of a wrong with
resultant injury and consequential damages which is cognizable in a court of law."
86 C.J.S. TORTS § 1 (1954). "A 'tort' ... consists in a violation of a duty imposed by
general law or otherwise upon all person occupying the relation to each other which
is involved in a given transaction . . . ." Coleman v. California Yearly Meeting of
Friends Church, 27 Cal. App. 2d 579, 81 P.2d 469 (1938). "A tort is an unlawful
violation of a private legal right." J.M. Griffin & Sons v. Newton Butane Gas & Oil
Co., 162 Ala. 424, 50 So. 2d 370 (1951).
34 Legal duties may be derived from such sources as common law, statutes, and
sometimes even a moral duty so compelling as to be recognized by law. A legal duty
should be differentiated from the type of duty that arises in a contract. The duty




The Court states that "where federally protected rights have been
invaded . . . courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief." '85 Regarding ordinary tort actions, Pros-
ser states that "[w]hen it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests
are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant,
the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a
bar to the remedy."86 The basis for the remedy allowed in Bivens
and that recognized under general tort law is fundamentally the
same-the need to supply relief for injury resulting from the vio-
lation of a legal duty.
The unique aspect of Bivens, insofar as tort law is concerned,
is that the source of the legal duty is the Constitution. Since the
Constitution enunciates the supreme law of the land, legal duties
imposed by that document must be paramount to any other legal
considerations of less than constitutional stature. Bivens, therefore,
expouses what could be termed a "constitutional tort." If logically
extended to other constitutional guarantees and to state action, the
significance of this type of "tort" could be far reaching.
Viewing Bivens for the moment in terms of conventional tort
theory, several interesting questions are presented. Are conventional
tort defenses available? More specifically, is the defense of sover-
eign immunity applicable to a case involving the significant violation
of one's constitutional rights? May the government violate one's
constitutional rights and then safely hide behind the "nonconstitu-
tional" doctrine of sovereign immunity?" Resolution of this ques-
tion necessitates at least a brief examination of the traditional bases
underlying the notions of sovereign immunity.
The Traditional Role of Sovereign Immunity
Strictly applied, sovereign immunity effectively avoids govern-
mental liability for the tortious conduct of its agents. Therefore,
unless the government consents to be sued, victims of torts com-
mitted by governmental agents are left without judicial redress.
The origin of the doctrine in the United States is vague."8
Early courts seemed content to accept the doctrine as a fundamental
principle of government and refused to delve into the conflict be-
tween the ancient concept stemming from a feudal system and the
85 403 U.S. at 396, quoting from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
36 W. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 3.
37 See note 14, supra.
8 See, for pre-United States history of sovereign immunity, Borchard, Govern-




new ideas evolving under a constitutional democracy. The United
States Supreme Court recognized sovereign immunity almost with-
out question, meekly accepting the English notion that the "King
may do no wrong." 9 The rationale used by the courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, in adopting a doctrine so incon-
gruent with basic democratic principles, is suggested by some curious
language emanating from a nineteenth century Alabama court:
Although the individuals who have the administration of public affairs,
may commit very gross outrages, it is not congruous with the ideas of
order and duty, that the State, the august and sovereign body whose
servants they are, from which proceed all civil laws, and to which we
owe unstinted respect and honor, should be held capable of doing
wrongs, from which she should be made answerable as for tortious in-
juries, in her own courts to her own children or subjects. 4 0
Three decades later Justice Holmes rationalized sovereign immunity
by stating that:
[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal concep-
tion or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.
41
Although Holmes' logic was arguably faulty,42 the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity was by 1907 firmly entrenched in the law of the
United States.
With the doctrine imbedded, logically or not, in its judicial
framework, the United States began to feel pressures from the re-
sulting inequities. Individuals with claims against the government
attempted to get special legislation passed by Congress allowing
them to recover damages. As claims mounted in a specific area,
Congress would pass a narrowly drawn statute giving its consent
39 Early applications of sovereign immunity concerned the states. Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). The doctrine was first applied to the United States in United
States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834) in a mere obiter assumption by Chief
Justice Marshall. The doctrine was used later in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1869); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 122 (1869). In none of these cases is a satisfactory explanation offered as
to why such a doctrine exists in the United States. For a general history of sovereign
immunity in the United States, see Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity
Doctrine in the United States, 1966 U. ILL. L. FoRau- 795.
40 State v. Hill, 54 Ala. 67, 68 (1875).
41 Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Holmes' rationale is
certainly not appropriate when the legal right concerned is based upon the Constitution.
Holmes states that there can be no remedy "as against the authority that makes the
law." Since Congress did not "make" the law expressed by the Constitution, there is
no logical reason why Congress should consider itself in a special nonexempt position.
42 See Borchard, supra note 38, at 35, indicating that even the early English
concept of "the King can do no wrong" allowed certain remedies against the sovereign.
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to be sued under those particular circumstances.43 In 1887 Congress
passed the Tucker Act, in which the United States gave its general
consent to be sued in actions not sounding in tort."
On the whole, these legislative attempts to provide relief were
cumbersome and did not prevent the injustices resulting from gov-
ernmental immunity to general tort claims. 5 Finally, in 1946, the
Federal Tort Claims Act was passed, and it appeared that the United
States was ready to accept responsibility for the torts of its agents.
In the Federal Tort Claims Act the government gave its consent to
be sued on most tort claims.46 The effect of the Act was not to create
new causes of action where none existed before, but to waive im-
munity from recognized causes of action.47 The Act was designed to
provide a workable, consistent, and equitable system of remedies
against the government.4 ' Compared with the inequities that existed
prior to its passage, the Act did provide significant benefits to indi-
viduals wronged by the federal government.
Despite the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, however,
sovereign immunity at the federal level is hardly a moot issue. Im-
portant exceptions to the government's general waiver of immunity
are contained in the Act." Indeed, most of these exceptions appear
to involve the very issues that would form a constitutional cause
of action as developed in Bivens.
48 E.g., patent infringement, 36 Stat. 851 (1910); maritime torts, 41 Stat. 525
(1920); injury to oyster beds caused by dredging operations, 49 Stat. 1049 (1935).
44 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
45 Gillhorn, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COL-Ux. L. Rav
722 (1947).
46 [Tlhe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1971).
47 National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 275 (10th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
48 Feres v. U.S., 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
49 "[Slection 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused ...
.... (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrep-
resentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. . . ... 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a), (h) (1971).
[Vol. 12
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The two major exceptions to the general waiver of immunity
in the Act are broadly construed' ° and concern conduct that is either
discretionary or intentional. 1 Since the constitutional guarantees
enunciated by the Bill of Rights are generally construed to protect
individuals from the affirmative acts-i.e., acts which are either
intentional or within the scope of discretionary authority--of gov-
ernment, most "constitutional torts" would fall outside the general
waiver of federal immunity. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has specifically held that the mere fact that constitutional
rights are involved is not sufficient to avoid the Act's exceptions. 2
Ostensibly, relief for a "constitutional tort" will lie only when an
individual's rights are negligently infringed by the government-a
limitation that will seriously hamper the effectiveness of Bivens.
Thus, in many important instances a claim for relief under the
Bivens theory of "constitutional tort" will directly confront the
traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since most of the possible
constitutional causes of action would lie within the exceptions to
the Act, i.e., either discretionary or intentional conduct, sovereign
immunity could be viewed as a potentially dangerous foe which
might effectively destroy the significance of Bivens.
There has, however, been a distinct trend in the courts in
recent years away from sovereign immunity. Many courts have
become increasingly antagonistic toward the restrictive and often
unjust applications of the doctrine.w At the state level many legis-
5O See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Broadway Open Air
Theatre v. United States, 208 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1953); Klein v. United States, 167
F. Supp. 410 (D.C.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1959). But see In-
dian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Builder's Corp. of America
v. United States, 320 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 906 (1963).
51 The Bill of Rights was designed primarily to protect the individual from
certain types of affirmative government action. The Federal Tort Claims Act, on
the other hand, was passed mainly to redress negligent acts of the government. This
is apparent from the discretionary and intentional types of conduct excluded by 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a), (h) (1971). Thus, two different purposes are involved and one
cannot rely upon the Federal Tort Claims Act to protect constitutional rights, a
function for which it was not designed.
52 United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
971 (1964); Morton v. United States, 228 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 975 (1956). In Morton, a prisoner alleged that prison officials held him with-
out official commitment, deprived him of food and medical services, subjected him to
forms of mental and physical cruelty, and deprived him of use of the mails; his
claims were held not to state a cause of action since they fell within the exceptions of
28 U.S.C. § 2860(a), (h) (1971).
53 The following cases are drawn from jurisdictions expressing displeasure with
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Arizona-Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93
Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); California-Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Florida-Hargrove v. City of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Illinois-Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Kentucky-Haney v. City
19721
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latures have followed the lead of their state courts and have passed
statutes that waive immunity to tort suits against the state.54 The
degree to which the immunity is waived varies greatly, but most
states have recognized the need for some type of relief from the
harsh limitations of sovereign immunity. Still, the doctrine is not
dead at the state level either. Many state statutes contain, at the
very least, exceptions similar to those found in the Federal Tort
Claims Act.5" Thus, sovereign immunity as it pertains to the kind
of "constitutional tort" action described in Bivens remains a serious
obstacle at the state as well as the federal level.
The vitality of sovereign immunity, at the state level at least,
may also be questioned when viewed against the background of
federal statutes enacted to protect particular constitutional rights.
For example, 42 U.S.C. § 198356 provides a cause of action against
persons acting under color of state law who violate any right guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. However, there are two serious
limitations to this statutory remedy for the violation of constitutional
rights. First, the statute does not apply to persons operating under
the color of federal law;57 second, "persons" does not include gov-
ernmental bodies.58 Thus, in most cases governments may not be
of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Michigan-Williams v. City of Detroit,
364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Minnesota-Spanel v. Mounds View School
Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Nevada-Rice v. Clark County, 79
Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Washington-Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d
913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964); Wisconsin-Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). For a detailed discussion on the state judicial action away
from sovereign immunity, see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade
of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. FORUM 919.
54 E.g., Alaska-ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.50.250-.300 (Supp. 1965); California-CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§810-996.6 (West 1966); Illinois-ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §439.8(d)
(1966); New York-N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963);Vermont-VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §560 (Supp. 1965); Washington-WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §492.090
(Supp. 1965). See also Van AIstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of
Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. FoRuM 919. For specific problems concerning California
immunity see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463
(1963).
55 See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966
U. ILL. L. FORUM 919.
56 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
57 This was illustrated in Bivens, where petitioner alternatively pleaded a cause
of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of that
action since the federal agents had been operating pursuant to federal law. 409 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court did not even consider the issue. 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
58 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Bennett v. California, 406 F.2d 36
(9th Cir. 1969); Wilcher v. Sain, 311 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Note that in
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liable under this statute, 9 and the inequities characteristic of
sovereign immunity persist-the government may violate one's con-
stitutional rights and remain totally immune.
Thus, even today the doctrine of sovereign immunity appears
to be very much alive. Although governmental immunity from tort
liability has been soundly criticized for many years by a wide
variety of writers,' the concept lingers on. There can be little doubt
that this increasingly anachronistic doctrine still has a strong hold
upon the judicial and legislative minds of both state and federal
governments. Ironically, the remaining strength of sovereign im-
munity is often concentrated in areas protecting the government
from suit when it affirmatively violates an individual's constitutional
rights. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the federal government,
for example, will be liable when one of its trucks negligently injures
a pedestrian, but not when one of its agents intentionally holds a
prisoner without food or opens fire on a group of protesting stu-
dents.6" The appalling conclusion is inevitable: the governmental
entity, if allowed to cower behind the feudal doctrine of sovereign
immunity, remains free from liability for many abuses that the
Constitution was specifically created to protect against.
THE APPROACHING SHOWDOWN: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The Bivens case has brought into focus the stark contrast be-
tween individual rights derived from the Constitution and govern-
mental interests consistent with sovereign immunity. If in the
typical Bivens situation the government is to be immune from suit,
the remedy provided by the case is moot; liability for a govern-
mental violation of basic constitutional rights will continue to exist
only at the whim of Congress. But is the principle of sovereign im-
munity compatible with a "tort" action emanating from a consti-
tutional duty? This writer contends that it is not.
Wilcher a municipality was held to be exempt from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though
California allows its municipalities to be sued. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
09 For a discussion of a possible lessening of this government exemption, see
Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 Mnm. L. Rzv.
1201 (1971); Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Misconduct, 55 VA.
L. REv. 909 (1969). The views expressed in these articles have come to fruition in at
least one case, Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
0 See Borchard, Government Liability in Torts (pts 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129,
229 (1924-25); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MIIN. L. REv. 751
(1956); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Oflicers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Oflicers,
22 U. CH. L. REv. 610 (1955); Lefler and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States,
29 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1363 (1954).
61 Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948).
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Unfortunately, the potential destruction of the cause of action
in Bivens as a "constitutional tort" may be contained within the
case itself. Although the Court did not even consider the immunity
issue, the case indicates that Congress could limit or destroy the
action if it were so inclined.6 2 The possibility that Congress has such
power raises important constitutional considerations that are basic
to the relative functions of the Supreme Court and Congress. It is
to these issues we now turn.
Jurisdiction to Hear the Constitutional Issue
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that the
"judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."' The Constitution makes it clear,
therefore, that federal courts other than the Supreme Court are
created by authority of Congress and are subject to complete
congressional control. The Supreme Court, however, occupies a
different relationship to Congress. All judicial power is delegated
by the Constitution to that body. Congress may create, alter, or
destroy lower federal courts as it pleases." It may not however-
subject to the limitation discussed below-tamper with the Supreme
Court.05
Section 2 of article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution .... I'l This broad grant of power is limited, however,
by subsequent language:
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 67
Herein lies the crux of the problem. What exceptions may Congress
make concerning the Supreme Court's ability to hear constitutional
issues? Does Congress have, through its powers over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction, complete control over what consti-
tutional issues the Court may hear?
02 One of the issues discussed in Bivens is whether the Court has the power to
award damages absent any express congressional authorization; the Court assumes
that if such relief were expressly prohibited by Congress, the Court could not grant it.
403 U.S. at 397.
68 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
64 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) ; United States v. Arizona,
214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954). It logically follows that, since Congress may create these
courts, that body may also control their jurisdiction and remedies. Eastern States
Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
05 Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967).
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
67 Id. (Emphasis added).
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Neither the intent of the Framers of the Constitution nor the
subsequent development of the American judicial system indicates
that Congress is to have such total mastery of the Court and thus
the Constitution." If Congress were to so thoroughly control the
Supreme Court's ability to hear constitutional issues, the Consti-
tution's specific grant of judicial power to "all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution" would be rendered meaning-
less. The Supreme Court would occupy a position identical to "such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish" whenever a constitutional question was raised. The Con-
stitution must be read and interpreted as an interrelated whole;
one section should not be used to defeat another when a more con-
68 The Framers intended to create a balance of power among the three branches
of the federal government. See M. FERRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTTUnON
(1913). Alexander Hamilton stated that:
There ought always be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitu-
tional provisions. What for instance would avail restrictions on the authority
of the State legislatures without some constitutional mode of enforcing the
observance of them? .. .No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the govern-
ment to restrain or correct the infractions of them.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 535 (E. Cooke ed. 1961).
One expert has summarized the intent of the Framers thusly:
It is reasonable to conclude . . . that the Constitutional Convention gave
Congress authority to specify .. .orderly procedures and to modify the juris-
diction from time to time in response to prevailing social and political require-
ments, within the limits imposed by the Court's essential constitutional role.
It is not reasonable to conclude that the Convention gave Congress the power
to destroy that role. Reasonably interpreted, the clause means "With such
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress may make, not inconsistent
with the essential functions of the Supreme Court under this Constitution."
Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Rav. 157, 171 (1960).
Subsequent judicial history has further demonstrated the power of the Supreme
Court vis-a-vis Congress. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803),
the Court decided that the Constitution was "superior paramount law" and the Court
was vested with the ultimate authority to uphold that law. This doctrine of judicial
review has remained firmly established in our legal system. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Supreme Court is still the final arbiter of the Constitution and
if access to that forum is denied, then the Court is prohibited from exercising its most
important function. As Marshall stated in Marbury:
The judicial power of the United States is extended to the Supreme Court to
all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who
gave this power, to say, that in using it, the constitution should not be looked
into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided, without
examining the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be
maintained.
Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 178. The concept of the Supreme Court as the protector
against invasion of constitutional rights is so interwoven with the fabric of our
democratic system that any encroachment upon that position is suspect. Matthews v.
Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932); Hargrove v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
No legislative body, federal or state, may deny the Court authority to hear a
constitutional issue. "Congress surely cannot dilute or abrogate existing constitutional
guarantees in the guise of exercising its authority to vest, withhold or restrict the
judicial power of inferior courts." Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 705 (N.D. Cal.
1968). To hold otherwise would subject the Constitution to legislative control, ciearly
a violation of judicial precedent.
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sistent interpretation exists. 69 The section providing Congress with
the power to make certain regulations must not be interpreted as
providing that body with the authority to deprive the Court of all
meaningful judicial power to hear a constitutional question. 0
The Due Process Limitation on Congressional Regulation
Two constitutional provisions contained in article III, section
2-the right to be heard on a constitutional issue and the power of
Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
-might at first glance appear to be mutually repugnant. The solu-
tion to this apparent dilemma, however, is found by fundamental
constitutional interpretation. Congress may regulate access to the
Supreme Court only in a reasonable manner; any unreasonable
limitation upon the Court's ability to hear a constitutional question
constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Such an interpretation, of course, makes the Constitution
logically consistent and is fully in line with contemporary concepts
of constitutional law.71
Congress may control appellate jurisdiction in a reasonable
manner; it may require that certain procedures be followed or that
particular legal principles which are not in conflict with the Con-
stitution be obeyed. 2 Some matters may be limited to a particular
type of federal court.7 a Such regulations are designed to expedite
the smooth flow of litigation within the federal judicial system and
to ensure review consistent with principles of American juris-
prudence. Such was undoubtedly the purpose behind article III.
When, however, the congressional power to regulate the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction is utilized to deprive an individual of
a hearing concerning the violation of his constitutional rights,
69 See Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 743 (W.D. La. 1965);
Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 97 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953).
70 See Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960). See also Elliott, Court-Curbing
Proposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAm.E LAW. 597 (1958); Merry, Scope of the Supreme
Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MiN-. L. REv. 53 (1962).
71 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 130 (1946) (concurring opinion);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; St. Josephs Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281
U.S. 673 (1930) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ; Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948); Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal.
1968). See also Ratner, Congressional Power Over Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
72 E.g., a state law challenged as unconstitutional must be construed by a state
court prior to federal action. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
Constitutional questions must be raised in the lower court. Bailey v. Anderson, 326
U.S. 203 (1945).
78 Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
[Vol. 12
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
questions of due process arise.74 As stated previously, when con-
gressional regulations made pursuant to article III, section 2 con-
flict with notions of due process, the regulations must fall.
We have seen that the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
codified by the Federal Tort Claims Act limits the federal courts'
ability to hear certain complaints. Such a limitation is invalid only
when it violates the constitutional mandate of due process. The
question remains, therefore, whether sovereign immunity violates
due process when it prevents a constitutionally based tort from being
heard. Indications are that it does.
Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims 5 stated a proposition
basic to the question presented here: denial of any constitutionally
protected right demands judicial protection.76 Moreover, it has been
held in several instances that where constitutional rights are con-
cerned the due process clause77 guarantees reasonable access to the
courts. The notion of judicial "fairness" intrinsic to due process will
permit no other conclusion-a denial of fundamental rights should
never go without redress.78
74 The jurisdictional amount necessary for access to federal courts raises interest-
ing questions in this regard. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1966) requires that for a federal court
to have jurisdiction, damages of at least $10,000 must be alleged when a federal
question is raised. The rationale behind the requirement is that it keeps the federal
courts free from petty, insignificant claims. It also could prohibit many valid consti-
tutional issues from being heard in any forum. This issue, however, is generally
rendered moot owing to a series of statutes that waive jurisdictional amounts when
particular types of issues are in controversy. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 32
(1963). Indeed, many aspects of the congressional power to control appellate juris-
diction have not come under close scrutiny because of a general congressional policy
of providing federal courts with broad jurisdiction.
75 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
76 See generally Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Knoll Associates, Inc. v. F.T.C., 397 F.2d
530 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd., 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) ;
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Thigpen
v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd, 378 U.S. 554 (1963); Parker
v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1951), appeal dismissed, 191 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.
1951).
77 Although the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments may
seem to differ, the same principles are applicable to each. Earnest v. Willingham, 406
F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Foley Securities Corp. v. C.I.R., 106 F.2d 731 (8th Cir.
1939).
78 DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314,
316 (9th Cir. 1963); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961).
Although these cases involve criminal actions, where due process is concerned courts
need not distinguish between criminal and civil cases. "It is the importance of the
right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which
should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally
required in each case." Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The funda-
mental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard. Id.
See also Escarlar v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Holmes v. New York Housing Authority,
398 F.2d 262 (1968).
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The "reasonableness" of access to the courts may often depend
upon the importance of the issue to be heard. Certainly an issue
based upon the Constitution is of the highest importance. 9 As
discussed previously, if Bivens' claim could not be heard in a federal
court based upon a constitutional right, any relief would be ef-
fectively denied. Thus, if sovereign immunity prevents constitutional
claims from being heard, violation of the rights involved will go
totally without remedy. The Supreme Court has stated that "any
deprivation of constitutional rights calls for prompt rectification....
The basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the here
and now and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason,
they are to be promptly fulfilled.""0 Sovereign immunity hardly
presents an "overwhelmingly compelling reason" to render adjudica-
tion of a violation of a constitutional right totally nugatory.81
Use of the due process clause to protect constitutional rights
in situations similar to those considered in this comment is not with-
out precedent.82 For example, in Miller v. Howe Sound Mining Co., 3
Congress had placed certain jurisdictional requirements on claims
concerning compensation for private property that had been taken
by the federal government. The result of these limitations was to
deny some claimants access to any judicial hearing. The court in
Miller held that the denial of access to the courts to hear a consti-
tutionally protected right deprived the claimant of due process of
law. The court further stated that "Congress cannot destroy con-
stitutionally protected property rights by the expedient of with-
drawing jurisdiction from every court in which suits for enforcement
could be brought."8 4 In cases like Bivens, Congress might attempt
to use the same technique to deny a remedy for a "constitutional
tort"-i.e., deny plaintiffs access to any court through utilization of
sovereign immunity. Surely a fatal difference between the situation
in Miller and that in Bivens may not be maintained because of a
superiority of constitutionally protected property rights over con-
stitutionally guaranteed individual rights. Thus, Miller lends strong
support to the inevitable conclusion that sovereign immunity may
79 See note 68, supra.
80 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1963).
81 Whatever justification may have existed at one time for sovereign immunity,
it is no longer applicable, especially on the federal level. Such contentions as inability
of the government to afford tort liability or that absence of the doctrine invites a
landslide of lawsuits against the government have been shown to be without merit.
See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1963).
82 The fifth amendment provides, in part, that no "private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, § 1.
88 77 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wash. 1948).
84 Id. at 545.
[Vol. 12
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
not be used as a jurisdictional device to deny a judicial hearing of
an individual's fundamental rights.
Remedies
Assuming, arguendo, the inability of Congress to bar juris-
dictional access to the Supreme Court for the hearing of a "constitu-
tional tort" claim, the question of what remedies the Court may
provide remains. Bivens implied that Congress could prohibit the
Court from granting remedial relief for a "constitutional tort."
85
This view is clearly inconsistent with both judicial precedent and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
There can be little doubt that no legal right has been protected
if a court having jurisdiction lacks the ability to grant an effective
remedy."6 The need for federal courts in particular to "fashion
judicial remedies to realities to assure actual enjoyment of consti-
tutional ideals" is certainly not novel-it has been suggested in
several cases.87 Federal courts, moreover, have used their power
to "fashion" remedial relief in a variety of situations demanding
judicial protection.88
The ability of the Court to provide relief for a "constitutional
tort" can be analogized to certain instances of statutory interpreta-
tion where the Court, after granting a remedy not specifically au-
thorized by the statute, claimed it was merely fulfilling congressional
intent8 9 For example, in .I. Case Co. v. Borak, ° the Court stated:
It is for federal courts to adjust their remedies so as to grant necessary
relief where federally secured rights are invaded . . . and when a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any remedy available to make good the wrong done.
9
'
The federal courts are entrusted with the interpretation of the Con-
stitution as well as congressional statutes. Thus, these same courts
85 403 U.S. at 397.
86 The Supreme Court put the issue this way: "Let the remedial process be
inadequate or unjust and the meaning of judicial review ceases to be clear." Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
87 Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967);
United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 1965).
88 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) [damages for unconstitutional
taking of property]; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) [exclusionary rule];
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) [action of ejectment]; Brewer v. Hoxie
School Dist., 238 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1957) [injunctive relief]; Nash v. Air Terminal
Serv., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949) [damages for deprivation of equal protection].
89 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S.
282, 288 (1940); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
0 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
91 Id. at 433.
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should have a similar ability to provide suitable remedies for vio-
lations of the Constitution.
Moreover, important procedural distinctions increase the sig-
nificance of the federal courts' power to "fashion" judicial remedies
where the question under consideration is of a constitutional rather
than a statutory nature. As the Borak case indicated, Congress
could specifically limit the judicial remedial response. Congress may
not, however, unreasonably limit the ability of the Supreme Court
to interpret constitutional provisions. 92 Similarly, the Court must
not be limited in its effort to provide appropriate remedies for bona
fide constitutional claims. Any unreasonable limitations would es-
sentially deprive federal courts of their ability to hear a constitu-
tional issue-a violation of due process. As one eminent legal scholar
has said:
There is nothing in the historical development of remedial jurispru-dence to suggest that remedial law has not been fully applied to protect
personal interests defined in "political" documents like the Constitu-
tion.... A federally created remedy in damages is possible under exist-ing decisions; is sensible under existing circumstances; and is necessary
for the protection of essential liberties.9 3
The ability of the federal courts to provide remedies for govern-
mental violations of constitutionally protected rights is essential to
the existence and continuance of those rights; this ability is perhaps
the most important element of due process in its most meaningful
form.
CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt after Bivens that the denial of access
to the courts for a "constitutional tort" is violative of the due processprovision of the fifth amendment. Congress may not use sovereign
immunity as a device to defeat the hearing of a "constitutional tort"
claim and may not so unreasonably limit the Court's remedial
responses as to violate due process.
Bivens opened the door to a cause of action based solely upon
the Constitution. Since the legal duty upon which that cause of
action is based is the Constitution, it may be defeated by defenses
92 "[Congress] must not so exercise that power [to control lower court juris-diction] as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948).93 Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1968). See alsoBell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1944); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States,323 U.S. 454 (1943); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943);Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLTM. L. REV. 1109 (1969).
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only of a comparable constitutional nature. To contend otherwise
would be to subordinate the Constitution to doctrines of lesser legal
stature. There can be little doubt that sovereign immunity as re-
tained by portions of the Federal Tort Claims Act is of such lesser
legal significance. If the government is to be permitted to shield it-
self from its own violations of the Constitution, a wronged indi-
vidual's fundamental rights will be effectively extinguished.
Whether the "constitutional tort" will provide an adequate
safeguard for particular individual rights is difficult to predict.
4
Due process, however, demands that constitutional rights be pro-
tected by the Supreme Court and that adequate remedies for in-
fringement of these rights be provided. The Federal Tort Claims
Act may be adequate legislation where conventional tort actions
are concerned,"5 but a different situation is presented when the tort
action is interwoven with a constitutional issue. The exceptions
contained within that Act should no longer be utilized to defeat
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
It is time for government, both federal and state, to recognize
that applications of sovereign immunity too frequently result in
unfettered violations of the Constitution. The Bivens case has
taken the first step by recognizing a cause of action based solely
upon the Constitution. The Supreme Court is now in the position
to continue its drive toward ensuring truly adequate protection of
the basic constitutional rights of all citizens. Where sovereign
immunity would deny an effective remedy in such a case, that doc-
trine must be unhesitatingly challenged, struck down, and discarded.
Edward P. Davis, Jr.
94 See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 493 (1955).
95 Even in the case of conventional tort actions an argument may be made 
that
sovereign immunity is unconstitutional. Using the equal protection 
clause, the
argument runs, two classes are created by sovereign immunity: those 
injured by
nongovernmental tortfeasors and those injured by governmental tortfeasors. Since
equal protection forbids unreasonable discrimination between protected 
groups,
sovereign immunity is invalid since the doctrine has no rational basis 
and blatantly
discriminates against those victims of government torts. The only court to 
accept this
argument has stated that "a distinction so based is capricious and represents 
no
policy but an arbitrary attempt to lift state responsibility without reason. 
In such cir-
cumstances the permissible line between reasonable classification or a rational 
policy,
and a denial of equal protection is crossed." Krause v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App. 
2d 1, 321
N.E.2d 321, 327 (1971). There is some doubt as to the validity of the equal protection
argument; i.e., are tort victims a protected "group"; are all aspects of 
sovereign
immunity capricious? These questions remain. This writer believes, however, 
that
there can be no doubt that when a "constitutional tort" is involved sovereign 
im-
munity is not applicable.
